Hendrajit
The success of military coup in Thailand is still shrouded with mystery, whether it is because of the blessing given by the King Bhumibol Adulyadej and the growing support silently given by the Thai Society in general over the corruption and factionalism among the party politicians in the parliament.
The other theory says that the military coup would not be impossible to succeed without the political backing of the United States. Did you still remember the failed coup attempt launched by General Suchinda Kraprayon in 1991? The military coup was successfully blocked by the strong resistance of professional middle classes and businesspeople because of the active support from the policy makers in Washington.
It is certainly logical given the fact that the influence of the US on the development of the Thai armed forces is so great, thus it is inconceivable that the military ties between these two countries would be easily severed or impaired.
Dating back to the end of World War Two, the Thai government relied on the US in the development of its armed forces, the country’s security and the training of military personnel.
Just for an example, several high-ranking generals turned prime minister such as General Chauvalit, General Kriangsak, General Prem Tinsulanond, General Suchinda Kraprayon and General Pitchit, all of them received advanced military training in US.
It has become an army tradition in Thailand to send its top students in the US military school to study in the US military educational institutions. Even the curricula in the academy and the staff school were developed from those of American counterpart.
Weapons system if the three armed forces of Thailand is also based on that of the US, though recently China and Western Europe have become heavy arms suppliers.
In terms of Thai foreign policy related to national security, the military role in the area of national defense and security has an impact on the making and implementation of Thai foreign policy.
In the historical perspective up to the present time, the technocrats in the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the military officers have dominated foreign policy making. In the 1960s and 1970s the military dominated foreign policy making which tended to be pro US foreign policy rather than relatively independent as shown by Indonesia or Malaysia.
The bilateral agreement with US to allow establishment of American military base in the country during the Vietnam War in the 1970s, the sending of troops to fight Vietnam, and the Thai military operations in Laos to counter Pathet Lao movement in the 1960s and early1970s, were seen as outstanding examples of the military’s dominance in the foreign and security affairs of the period.
But more than just the military influence in policy making, the Thai military is colored by political clique, where a hardcore of friends and relatives begin to recruit supporters from the ranks of their brother officers.
Since official salaries have always been notoriously inadequate for the basic needs—not to mention the dreams—of many officers, each rising faction must find itself a source of supplementary income. While graft within the military itself provides a certain amount of money, all cliques are eventually forced to extend their tentacles into the civilian sector.
A clique usually concentrates on taking over a single government ministry or monopolizing a certain realm of business, such as the rice trade or the lumber industry.
Even among the Thai generals, factionalism and conspiracy take place. For instance, From 1947 to 1957, Thai politics was dominated by an intense rivalry between two powerful cliques: one led by General Phao Sriyanonda and the other by Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Both men were catapulted upward by the November 1947 coup which restored to power Thailand's wartime leader, Marshal Phibun Songkhram.
Too weak to execute the coup himself, Marshal Phibun had recruited these two powerful army cliques. The clique led by Sarit was composed mainly of ambitious young army off
